Strategic candidacy and voting procedures

Authors:
  • BDBhaskar Dutta
    Bhaskar Dutta
  • MJMatthew O. Jackson
    Matthew O. Jackson
  • MBMichel LE Breton
    Michel LE Breton

Abstract
We study the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some candidate can affect the outcome by entering or exiting the election, even when they do not win the election. Given that strategic candidacy always matters, we analyze the impact of strategic candidacy effects. We show that the equilibrium set of outcomes of the well-known voting by successive elimination procedure expands in a well-defined way when strategic candidacy is accounted for.
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