Abstract
Do personnel professionalization reforms that remove lower-ability bureaucrats enhance or reduce performance? In a tournament-theoretic model, these reforms seek to improve performance through selection of higher-ability agents. However, they also alter incentives for remaining incumbents: peer pressure increases effort, while reduced competition decreases it, leading to an ambiguous net effect. We investigate this question by exploiting China's 2014 Judge Quota Reform, a largescale professionalization that eliminated approximately 40% of judges. Using a novel dataset of over sixteen million first-instance judgements from about 2,700 courts, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in the judge elimination rate improves performance (proxied by lower textual similarity between judgements) by 0.05 percentage points. A magnitude accounting reveals that the positive selection effect dominates the net negative influence from altered effort incentives. Our results manifest a critical trade-off in state capacity building: the lasting benefit of a higher-ability workforce incurs a persistent cost by weakening effort incentives, underscoring the necessity of complementary incentive structures in reform designs.