Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Cycle? Evidence from 36 Elections
Authors:
- Scott L. FeldSFScott L. Feld
- Bernard GrofmanBGBernard Grofman
- 1 April 1992
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 4 (2) , 231-237
Abstract
We analyze 36 elections held by professional associations, unions, and non-profit organizations in England and Ireland. We show that these elections manifest a remarkably high degree of transitivity, with a Condorcet (majority) winner always found. Moreover, ordering alternatives according to their Borda score provides a transitive majority ordering in nearly all instances.Keywords
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