Heeding to the Losers: Legislators' Trade‐Policy Preferences and Legislative Behavior
- 15 June 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 47 (3) , 539-603
Abstract
Electoral incentives affect legislators' responsiveness to voters, parties, and other stakeholders. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems with party control over nominations foster party discipline and reduce legislators' responsiveness to local constituents when at odds with the party. Yet, even under closed‐list PR regimes policymakers have incentives to respond to local interests who help advance their political careers. We illustrate this argument using evidence from a survey of Argentine legislators and a roll‐call vote on a salient export tax bill. Despite the incentives created by the electoral regime, we find that legislators' trade‐policy preferences and legislative behavior reflect the expected consequences of trade on local constituents. Our evidence suggests that catering to voters, rather than organized interests, are more likely to motivate legislators to defy their parties. These findings underscore the importance of understanding when and how catering to local constituents can affect politicians’ trade policy choices.Keywords
Funding Information
- Institute of Latin American Studies, Columbia University
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