Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games
Authors:
- John B. Van HuyckJHJohn B. Van Huyck
- John M. WildenthalJWJohn M. Wildenthal
- Raymond C. BattalioRBRaymond C. Battalio
- 1 January 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 38 (1) , 156-175
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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