Myopic Loss Aversion under Ambiguity and Gender Effects
Open Access
- 14 December 2016
- journal article
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 11 (12) , e0161477
Abstract
Experimental evidence suggests that the frequency with which individuals get feedback information on their investments has an effect on their risk-taking behavior. In particular, when they are given information sufficiently often, they take less risks compared with a situation in which they are informed less frequently. We find that this result still holds when subjects do not know the probabilities of the lotteries they are betting upon. We also detect significant gender effects, in that the frequency with which information is disclosed mostly affects male betting behavior, and that males become more risk-seeking after experiencing a loss.Keywords
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