Formal Analysis of the Kaminsky DNS Cache-Poisoning Attack Using Probabilistic Model Checking
Authors:
- Nikolaos AlexiouNANikolaos Alexiou
- Stylianos BasagiannisSBStylianos Basagiannis
- Panagiotis KatsarosPanagiotis Katsaros
- Tushar DashpandeTDTushar Dashpande
- Scott A. SmolkaSSScott A. Smolka
- 1 November 2010
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 15302059,p. 94-103
Abstract
We use the probabilistic model checker PRISM to formally model and analyze the highly publicized Kaminsky DNS cache-poisoning attack. DNS (Domain Name System) is an internet-wide, hierarchical naming system used to translate domain names such as google.com into physical IP addresses such as 208.77.188.166. The Kaminsky DNS attack is a recently discovered vulnerability in DNS that allows an intruder to hijack a domain, i.e. corrupt a DNS server so that it replies with the IP address of a malicious web server when asked to resolve URLs within a non-malicious domain such as google.com. A proposed fix for the attack is based on the idea of randomizing the source port a DNS server uses when issuing a query to another server in the DNS hierarchy. We use PRISM to introduce a Continuous Time Markov Chain representation of the Kaminsky attack and the proposed fix, and to perform the required probabilistic model checking. Our results, gleaned from more than 240 PRISM runs, formally validate the existence of the Kaminsky cache-poisoning attack even in the presence of an intruder with virtually no knowledge of the victim DNS server's actions. They also serve to quantify the effectiveness of the proposed fix: using nonlinear least-squares curve fitting, we show that the probability of a successful attack obeys a 1/N distribution, where N is the upper limit on the range of source-port ids. We also demonstrate an increasing attack probability with an increasing number of attempted attacks or increasing rate at which the intruder guesses the source-port id.Keywords
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