U.S. Economic Sanction Threats Against China: Failing to Leverage Better Human Rights
Authors:
- 7 September 2006
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 2 (4) , 307-324
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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