Strategic Sequential Bidding for Government Land Auction Sales – Evidence from Singapore
Authors:
- 1 August 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
- Vol. 57 (4) , 535-565
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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