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Contests with stochastic abilities
Home
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Contests with stochastic abilities
Contests with stochastic abilities
Authors:
KK
Kai A. Konrad
Kai A. Konrad
DK
Dan Kovenock
Dan Kovenock
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1 January 2010
preprint
Published by
RePEc
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RePEc
Abstract
We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate. We also show that an increase in the dispersion of a player's own ability generally benefits this player. It may benefit or harm his rival but cannot benefit the rival more than it benefits himself. We also explore the role of stochastic ability for sequential contests with the same opponent (multibattle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination tournaments) and show that it reduces the strong discouragement effects and holdup problems that may otherwise emerge in such games. High own ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. © 2008 Western Economic Association International.
Keywords
STOCHASTIC ABILITY
DISCRIMINATING
PARTICIPATING
OWN ABILITY
DISPERSION
OPPONENT
CONTESTS
RIVAL
All Related Versions
Version 1, 2010-01-01, RePEc
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