Efficient Auctions
Authors:
- 1 May 2000
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 115 (2) , 341-388
Abstract
We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all available information). For private values, the Vickrey auctionKeywords
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