Financial Regulation, Credit Risk and Financial Stability
Author:
- C. A.E. GoodhartCGC. A.E. Goodhart
- 1 April 2005
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in National Institute Economic Review
- Vol. 192 (1) , 118-127
Abstract
In contrast to recent successful developments in macro monetary policies, the modelling, measurement and management of systemic financial stability has remained problematical. Indeed, the focus of most effort has been on improving individual, rather than systemic, bank risk management; the Basel II objective has been to bring regulatory bank capital into line with the (sophisticated) banks‘ assessment of their own economic capital. Even at the individual bank level there are concerns over (i) appropriate diversification allowances, (ii) differing objectives of banks and regulators, (iii) the need for a buffer over regulatory minima, and (iv) the distinction between expected and unexpected losses (EL and UL). At the systemic level the quite complex and prescriptive content of Basel II raises dangers of ‘endogenous risk’ and procyclicality. Simulations suggest that this latter could be a serious problem.Keywords
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