GREENHOUSE‐GAS EMISSION CONTROLS IN AN OPEN ECONOMY*
Authors:
- 11 April 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 47 (2) , 431-450
Abstract
To examine how greenhouse‐gas emission controls affect a country's industrial and trade structures, this article presents an open economy model that has both Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin features. We specifically compare emission quotas, emission taxes, and emission standards. The patterns of production and trade critically hinge on those policy tools. It is shown that a domestic emission control may lead to carbon leakage and may not reduce the world emissions, and that emission standards may work as a “hidden” production subsidy toward an emission‐intensive industry.Keywords
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