Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions
Authors:
- Colin CamererCCColin Camerer
- Salvatore NunnariSNSalvatore Nunnari
- Thomas R. PalfreyTPThomas R. Palfrey
- 1 July 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 98, 243-263
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- National Science Foundation (SES-1426560)
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (SES-1158)
- Russell Sage Foundation
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