Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests
Author:
Top Cited Papers
- 17 December 2000
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 55 (6) , 2641-2692
Abstract
I develop and estimate a model of cash auction bankruptcy using data on 205 Swedish firms. The results challenge arguments that cash auctions, as compared to reorganizations, are immune to conflicts of interest between claimholders but lead to inefficient liquidations. I show that a sale of the assets back to incumbent management is a common bankruptcy outcome. Sale‐backs are more likely when they favor the bank at the expense of other creditors. On the other hand, inefficient liquidations are frequently avoided through sale‐backs when markets are illiquid, that is, when industry indebtedness is high and the firm has few nonspecific assets.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- Bankruptcy auctions: costs, debt recovery, and firm survivalJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- Asset Efficiency and Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt FirmsThe Journal of Finance, 1998
- How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became DistressedThe Journal of Finance, 1998
- Information problems, conflicts of interest, and asset stripping:Journal of Financial Economics, 1998
- Investor valuation of the abandonment optionJournal of Financial Economics, 1996
- Liquidation costs and capital structureJournal of Financial Economics, 1995
- Postbankruptcy Performance and Management TurnoverThe Journal of Finance, 1995
- A New Approach to Corporate ReorganizationsHarvard Law Review, 1988
- The Uneasy Case for Corporate ReorganizationsThe Journal of Legal Studies, 1986
- A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost QuestionThe Journal of Finance, 1984