On the Dynamic Duopolistic Game with Sticky Prices
Preprint
- 31 October 2022
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We analyze a discrete-time analog of Fershtman and Kamien's (1987) continuous-time duopoly model. As price adjustment becomes infinitely fast, the closed-loop equilibrium of Fershtman and Kamien's model remains distinct from the static Cournot equilibrium, but the closed-loop equilibrium of our discrete-time model always converges to the Cournot equilibrium. This discrepancy occurs because the frictionless limit of Fershtman and Kamien's continuous-time model represents an inappropriate limit of the discrete-time formulation. Similar phenomena appear in other continuous-time economic games.Keywords
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