A signaling theory of reservation cancellation policies
Authors:
- Yukyeong ChoiYCYukyeong Choi
- Jeong-Yoo KimJKJeong-Yoo Kim
- 5 November 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Modelling
- Vol. 130
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2022S1A5A2A0304932311)
- Ministry of Education
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