Equal Split vs Bargaining Power in Tacit Coordination: An Experiment on Disagreement Payoffs

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Abstract
We study whether the focal pull of the equal split or the distribution of bargaining power governs coordination in tacit distributional conflicts. In a coordination game offering both equal and unequal splits of the same total surplus, we manipulate players' relative bargaining power through their disagreement payoffs, shifting the prediction of the Nash Bargaining Solution away from equality and towards the stronger player's preferred outcome. Asymmetric disagreement payoffs reduce coordination on the equal split by 17.9 percentage points and increase coordination on the stronger player's preferred outcome by 11.7 percentage points. When bargaining power reverses, so does the direction of claiming, with the newly stronger player pushing for the unequal division in their own favour. However, the equal split remains the modal outcome. The results show that bargaining power can shape tacit division even when it operates only as an implicit threat embedded in disagreement payoffs, while the equal split remains the dominant convention, constraining how far that power moves the division.

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