Die Ministerienaufteilung in Koalitionsregierungen – eine modelltheoretische Näherung mit Hilfe von Divisor-Verfahren
- 6 January 2015
- book chapter
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 159-191
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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