Why Do Governments Delegate Authority to Quasi-Autonomous Agencies? The Case of Independent Administrative Authorities in France
Author:
- 1 April 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 19 (2) , 207-227
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
- Credible Commitment, Political Uncertainty or Policy Complexity? Explaining Variations in the Independence of Non-majoritarian Institutions in FranceBritish Journal of Political Science, 2005
- Governance traditions and narratives of public sector reform in contemporary FrancePublic Administration, 2003
- The Engines of European Integration2003
- Deliberate Discretion?2002
- Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual MediationWest European Politics, 2002
- Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian InstitutionsWest European Politics, 2002
- Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a comparative empirical analysisJournal of European Public Policy, 2002
- Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of AgenciesVirginia Law Review, 1989
- The Politics of Blame AvoidanceJournal of Public Policy, 1986