Overcoming the Biases of Microfoundationalism
- 24 June 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 43 (3) , 301-322
Abstract
The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach to social explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individuals has given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3) It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition perspective combined with organization studies could provide us with explanatory understanding of the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents.Keywords
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