The association between related-party transactions and control–ownership wedge: Evidence from Korea
Authors:
- Minjung KangMKMinjung Kang
- Ho-Young LeeHLHo-Young Lee
- Myung-Gun LeeMLMyung-Gun Lee
- Jong Chool ParkJPJong Chool Park
- 1 September 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
- Vol. 29, 272-296
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 43 references indexed in Scilit:
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