Two Naked Emperors?* Concerns about the Stability & Growth Pact and Second Thoughts about Central Bank Independence
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- 1 September 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Fiscal Studies
- Vol. 25 (3) , 249-277
Abstract
This paper addresses two sets of issues relevant to current and prospective future E(M)U members: the consequences of the Stability & Growth Pact for fiscal‐financial sustainability and macroeconomic stability, and some risks associated with operational independence of the central bank. To be effective as a lender of last resort or to stabilise demand when short nominal interest rates are close to their zero lower bound, the central bank must coordinate and cooperate with the fiscal authorities. Central bank independence is unlikely to survive if such coordination and cooperation are not forthcoming.Keywords
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