Hostages, marginal deterrence and franchise contracts
Author:
- Antony W. DnesADAntony W. Dnes
- 1 June 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 9 (3) , 317-331
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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