Leverage decision and manager compensation with choice of effort and volatility
Authors:
- Fernando ZapateroFZFernando Zapatero
- 1 July 2004
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 73 (1) , 71-92
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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