Voluntary purchases and adverse selection in the market for flood insurance
Authors:
- Jacob T. BradtJBJacob T. Bradt
- Carolyn KouskyCKCarolyn Kousky
- Oliver E.J. WingOWOliver E.J. Wing
- 1 October 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 110
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (HSHQDC-17-C-B0032)
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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