Causal Contributions and Liability
Author:
- Victor TadrosVTVictor Tadros
Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Ethics
- Vol. 128 (2) , 402-431
Abstract
This article explores the extent to which the magnitude of harm that a person is liable to suffer to avert a threat depends on the magnitude of her causal contribution to the threat. Several different versions of this view are considered. The conclusions are mostly skeptical—facts that may determine how large of a causal contribution a person makes to a threat are not morally significant, or not sufficiently significant to make an important difference to liability. However, understanding ways in which causation may be scalar helps to deepen our understanding of other morally significant facts, such as responsibility.Keywords
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