Abstract
If, as a number of recent proponents have argued, ‘pluri-national’ federalism holds great promise as a means of democratization and conflict resolution in deeply divided societies, why has it so rarely been tried in sub-Saharan Africa, home to arguably the world's most ethnically diverse nations? Using Nigeria—Africa's largest and oldest federal system—as a case study, it is argued that the legacy of late colonial, indirect rule institutions on citizenship and the politics of belonging pose a serious challenge for designing successful consociational powersharing arrangements. In particular, Nigeria's dependence on a primordial notion of ethnic citizenship undermines the ability of its federal institutions to mediate and cross-cut ethnic conflicts, a problem most clearly reflected in the functioning of the nation's most important official powersharing institution, the Federal Character Commission (FCC). Although the quota systems for governmental employment operated by the FCC are officially tied to Nigeria's 36 states, in both administrative law and practice they enforce a highly discriminatory ‘indigeneity’ system that privileges ethnic origins over federal citizenship.

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