Endogenous Determinants for Renegotiating Concessions: Evidence from Local Infrastructure
- 25 June 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Local Government Studies
- Vol. 39 (3) , 352-374
Abstract
The engagement of local government in public–private partnerships (PPPs) for the provision of infrastructure and public services is a global trend. Light rail services, water systems, waste management systems, schools, sport centres and social housing are simply a few examples of sectors in which the private sector is becoming more actively involved with local authorities. Most of these engagements are conducted through the use of mixed companies and contractual concessions. However, both of these uses suffer from a major shortcoming – renegotiations. Contracts are often renegotiated within a few years of being signed, and some evidence reveals that the results might not protect the public interest. This article aims to understand how and why renegotiations of local concessions occur by examining the specific characteristics of contracts (endogenous determinants). To illustrate the discussion, a case study of a light rail system is analysed, exemplifying the effect of a contractual renegotiation. The authors argue that contractual renegotiation can be useful in decreasing contract incompleteness, but a poorly designed contractual clause can allow for opportunistic concessionaire behaviour.Keywords
This publication has 44 references indexed in Scilit:
- Viability of Municipal Companies in the Provision of Urban Infrastructure ServicesLocal Government Studies, 2011
- Partial Privatisation in Local Services Delivery: An Empirical Analysis of the Choice of Mixed FirmsLocal Government Studies, 2010
- Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government‐led renegotiationJournal of Applied Econometrics, 2007
- Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New ThoughtsAmerican Economic Review, 2007
- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?Econometrica, 1999
- Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable InformationEconometrica, 1994
- The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine ProcurementThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1993
- Procurement and RenegotiationJournal of Political Economy, 1986
- Moral Hazard in TeamsThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1982
- Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATVThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1976