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Price Discounts in Rights Issues: Why Do Managers Insist on What Investors Hate?
Home
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Price Discounts in Rights Issues: Why Do Managers Insist on What Investors Hate?
Price Discounts in Rights Issues: Why Do Managers Insist on What Investors Hate?
Authors:
JF
Jorge Farinha
Jorge Farinha
Cesario Mateus
Cesario Mateus
NS
Nuno Soares
Nuno Soares
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Preprint
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1 January 2014
preprint
Published by
Elsevier
in
SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2500844
Abstract
We analyse the causes and impact of the significant mean price discounts (25% for financial and 29% for non-financial firms) in rights issues in the UK using a
Keywords
RIGHTS ISSUES
MARKET EFFICIENCY
EQUITY FINANCING
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