The Value of Repeated Games with an Informed Controller
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- 1 February 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 37 (1) , 154-179
Abstract
We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform value, generalizing several results of the literature. A preliminary existence result is obtained for a particular class of stochastic games played with pure strategies.Keywords
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