Dissociable Realization and Kind Splitting
- 1 December 2004
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 71 (5) , 960-971
Abstract
It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion.Keywords
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