The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe
Author:
- Andrew MoravcsikAMAndrew Moravcsik
Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 54 (2) , 217-252
Abstract
Most formal international human rights regimes establish international committees and courts that hold governments accountable to their own citizens for purely internal activities. Why would governments establish arrangements so invasive of domestic sovereignty? Two views dominate the literature. “Realist” theories assert that the most powerful democracies coerce or entice weaker countries to accept norms; “ideational” theories maintain that transnational processes of diffusion and persuasion socialize less-democratic governments to accept norms. Drawing on theories of rational delegation, I propose and test a third “republican liberal” view: Governments delegate self-interestedly to combat future threats to domestic democratic governance. Thus it is not mature and powerful democracies, but new and less-established democracies that will most strongly favor mandatory and enforceable human rights obligations. I test this proposition in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights—the most successful system of formal international human rights guarantees in the world today. The historical record of its founding—national positions, negotiating tactics, and confidential deliberations—confirms the republican liberal explanation. My claim that governments will sacrifice sovereignty to international regimes in order to dampen domestic political uncertainty and “lock in” more credible policies is then generalized theoretically and applied to other human rights regimes, coordination of conservative reaction, and international trade and monetary policy.Keywords
This publication has 41 references indexed in Scilit:
- Is Anybody Still a Realist?International Security, 1999
- Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy. Comparative Perspectives: USA, France, ItalyRatio Juris, 1998
- Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational AdjudicationThe Yale Law Journal, 1997
- Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International PoliticsInternational Organization, 1997
- The Path to European IntegrationComparative Political Studies, 1996
- Compromising WestphaliaInternational Security, 1995
- The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth CenturyForeign Affairs, 1992
- The European Monetary SystemSouthern Economic Journal, 1990
- Inflation and the European Monetary System1988
- International human rights: a regime analysisInternational Organization, 1986