Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- 26 October 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 82 (4) , 219-244
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- DFG (RO-1202/15-1)
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