Abstract
Living wage practices in global supply chains have gained growing traction across stakeholders and in public discourse. While firms often lack the legal jurisdiction to enforce wage rates at independent suppliers, they increasingly engage in public pledges to ensure living wages for workers in their supply chains. We develop an analytical model to examine the implications of living wage pledges in a supply chain where a supplier builds capacity before its buyer's order. We show that, even when pledges do not enhance market demand at all, the buyer may voluntarily make a pledge, which simultaneously benefits both supply chain parties and labor welfare. The key rationale is that public pledges mitigate inefficiencies due to the buyer's lack of commitment power to future orders under demand uncertainty. Making a pledge triggers greater public scrutiny that enables the buyer to commit to larger production orders; this encourages supplier capacity investment and organically raises wage payments. Moreover, we demonstrate that setting an excessively high living wage target may paradoxically reduce welfare by rendering the pledge unsustainable in equilibrium. Our findings suggest that while public discourse drives ethical labor practice, policymakers must calibrate living wage standards carefully, taking into account not only local cost-of-living conditions but also supply chain costs, to avoid destroying the economic incentives that sustain voluntary ethical labor practices.