Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?
Author:
Top Cited Papers
- 17 December 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 55 (6) , 2599-2640
Abstract
This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers result from replacing incumbent managers and gains from friendly takeovers result from strategic synergies. Alternatively, hostility could reflect strategic choices made by the bidder or the target. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, except that hostile transactions involve publicity as part of the bargaining process.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- Corporate Cash Reserves and AcquisitionsThe Journal of Finance, 1999
- The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdingsJournal of Financial Economics, 1999
- Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measuresJournal of Financial Economics, 1995
- Evaluating the performance of value versus glamour stocks The impact of selection biasJournal of Financial Economics, 1995
- Does corporate performance improve after mergers?Journal of Financial Economics, 1992
- Managers' voting rights and corporate controlJournal of Financial Economics, 1989
- Managerial performance, Tobin's Q, and the gains from successful tender offersJournal of Financial Economics, 1989
- Triggering the 1987 stock market crashJournal of Financial Economics, 1989
- The characteristics of takeover targets and other measuresJournal of Banking & Finance, 1985
- Mergers and the Market for Corporate ControlJournal of Political Economy, 1965