The Paradox of Unpredictability: Trying to Be Unpredictable Makes Sequences More Predictable
Preprint
Abstract
Human intuition about randomness is systematically biased. When asked to generate random sequences, people systematically generate too many alternations, yet game theory suggests that being unpredictable to an opponent requires true randomness. In our first experiment (50 Japanese adults), we show that when the goal shifts from being random to being unpredictable, participants do the opposite, generating sequences with a strong repetition bias. In a second experiment, we asked a new sample of 50 Japanese adults to predict two model-derived sequences that were empirically calibrated to the group-level statistics from the first Experiment (Competitive-like vs Random-like). We found a paradox: the repetitive sequences intended to be unpredictable were in fact more predictable than the alternating sequences intended to be random. This paradox appears to stem from an asymmetric reinforcement learning mechanism, whereby success selectively strengthens beliefs in repetition but not alternation. Our findings bridge classic cognitive bias and strategic behavior, suggesting how a fundamental learning mechanism can shape paradoxical predictability.Keywords
Funding Information
- Japan Science and Technology Agency (JPMJAX24LA)
This publication has 96 references indexed in Scilit:
- Does level-k behavior imply level-k thinking?Experimental Economics, 2020
- A review of predictive coding algorithmsBrain and Cognition, 2017
- Asymmetric Predictability and Cognitive Competition in Football Penalty ShootoutsCurrent Biology, 2014
- Predictive codingWIREs Cognitive Science, 2011
- Information Theory of Decisions and Actions2010
- The role of experience in the Gambler's FallacyJournal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2009
- The Gambler’s Fallacy and the Hot Hand: Empirical Data from CasinosJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2005
- On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental EvidenceGames and Economic Behavior, 1995
- Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental StudyGames and Economic Behavior, 1995
- Experimental evidence on players' models of other playersJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1994