AVFSM
Authors:
Open Access
- 5 June 2016
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Abstract
A finite state machine (FSM) is responsible for controlling the overall functionality of most digital systems and, therefore, the security of the whole system can be compromised if there are vulnerabilities in the FSM. These vulnerabilities can be created by improper designs or by the synthesis tool which introduces additional don't-care states and transitions during the optimization and synthesis process. An attacker can utilize these vulnerabilities to perform fault injection attacks or insert malicious hardware modifications (Trojan) to gain unauthorized access to some specific states. To our knowledge, no systematic approaches have been proposed to analyze these vulnerabilities in FSM. In this paper, we develop a framework named Analyzing Vulnerabilities in FSM (AVFSM) which extracts the state transition graph (including the don't-care states and transitions) from a gate-level netlist using a novel Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) based approach and quantifies the vulnerabilities of the design to fault injection and hardware Trojan insertion. We demonstrate the applicability of the AVFSM framework by analyzing the vulnerabilities in the FSM of AES and RSA encryption module. We also propose a low-cost mitigation technique to make FSM more secure against these attacks.Keywords
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