Financial Intermediation, Leverage, and Macroeconomic Instability
Author:
- 1 October 2016
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
- Vol. 8 (4) , 199-224
Abstract
This paper investigates how financial sector leverage affects macroeconomic instability and welfare. In the model, banks borrow (use leverage) to allocate resources to productive projects and pro vide liquidity. When banks do not actively issue new equity, aggregate outcomes depend on the level of equity in the financial sector. Equilibrium is inefficient because agents do not internalize how their decisions affect volatility, aggregate leverage, and the returns on assets. Leverage creates systemic risk, which increases the frequency and duration of crises. Limiting leverage decreases asset price volatility and increases expected returns, which decrease the likelihood that the financial sector is undercapitalized. (JEL E32, E44, G01, G21)Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Liquidity and leverageJournal of Financial Intermediation, 2010
- Market Liquidity and Funding LiquidityThe Review of Financial Studies, 2008
- A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy AnalysisJournal of Political Economy, 2005
- Credit CyclesJournal of Political Economy, 1997
- Deposit insurance, market discipline and off-balance sheet banking risk of large U.S. commercial banksJournal of Banking & Finance, 1994
- Capital Structure and the Informational Role of DebtThe Journal of Finance, 1990
- Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity CreationThe Journal of Finance, 1990
- Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not haveJournal of Financial Economics, 1984
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and LiquidityJournal of Political Economy, 1983
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureJournal of Financial Economics, 1976