THE ECONOMICS OF FAKING ECSTASY
- 26 April 2011
- journal article
- review article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (1) , 277-285
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a signaling model of rational lovemaking. In the act of lovemaking, a man and a woman send each other possibly deceptive signals about their true state of ecstasy. For example, if one of the partners is not in ecstasy, then he or she may decide to fake it. The model predicts that (1) a higher cost of faking lowers the probability of faking; (2) middle-aged and old men are more likely to fake than young men; (3) young and old women are more likely to fake than middle-aged women; and (4) love, formally defined as a mixture of altruism and demand for togetherness, increases the likelihood of faking. The predictions are tested with data from the 2000 Orgasm Survey. Besides supporting the model's predictions, the data also reveal an interesting positive relationship between education and the tendency to fake in both men and women.Keywords
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
- So, What Did You Do Last Night? The Economics of InfidelityKyklos, 2008
- The economics of sexuality: The effect of HIV/AIDS on homosexual behavior in the United StatesJournal of Health Economics, 2008
- Too Cool for School? Signalling and CountersignallingThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2002
- The Effects of Sex Education on Teen Sexual Activity and Teen PregnancyJournal of Political Economy, 1999
- Sex, Property Rights, and DivorceEuropean Journal of Law and Economics, 1998
- Puzzles: Love and Spaghetti, The Opportunity Cost of VirtueJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1989
- The Economic Approach to Human Behavior1976
- A Theory of Social InteractionsJournal of Political Economy, 1974
- Job Market SignalingThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973