People who believe implausible claims are not cognitive misers: Evidence from evaluation tasks.
Authors:
- Samuel G. RobsonSRSamuel G. Robson
- Kate FaasseKFKate Faasse
- Eliza-Rose GordonEGEliza-Rose Gordon
- Samuel P. JonesSJSamuel P. Jones
- Natasha SmithNSNatasha Smith
- Kristy A. MartireKMKristy A. Martire
Open Access
- 1 June 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition
- Vol. 14 (2) , 275-287
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Australian Research Council (DP220102412)
- University of New South Wales
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