OVERCOMING MISTRUST
Author:
- Andrew KyddAKAndrew Kydd
- 1 November 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 12 (4) , 397-424
Abstract
Trust is often held to promote cooperation, but mistrust can hinder it. This article looks at how trust can be built through strategic interaction. I formalize the common intuition that trust needs to be built through small initial cooperative gestures. These gestures are shown to overcome mistrust and facilitate cooperation in an n-person social dilemma game. The model lends support to the idea that trust can be a product of rational strategic interaction. I then extend the result in a related model that shows how trust can arise between nonaltruistic actors in iterated settings.Keywords
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