Information asymmetry, agency costs, and payout policies: An international analysis of IFRS adoption and the global financial crisis
Authors:
- Wolfgang BesslerWBWolfgang Bessler
- Halit GonencHGHalit Gonenc
- Mario Hernandez TinocoMTMario Hernandez Tinoco
Open Access
- 10 August 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Systems
- Vol. 47 (4)
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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