Personal sustained cooperation based on Networked Evolutionary Game Theory
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Preprint
- 3 April 2023
- preprint
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory on complex networks provides an effective theoretical tool to explain the emergence of sustained cooperative behavior. Human society has formed various organizational networks. The network structure and individual behavior take on a variety of forms. This diversity provides the basis for choice, so it is crucial for the emergence of cooperation. This article provides a dynamic algorithm for individual network evolution, and calculates the importance of different nodes in the network evolution process. In the dynamic evolution simulation, the probability of the cooperation strategy and betrayal strategy is described. In the individual interaction network, cooperative behavior will promote the continuous evolution of individual relationships and form a better aggregative interpersonal network. The interpersonal network of betrayal has been in a relatively loose state, and its continuity must rely on the participation of new nodes, but there will be certain "weak links" in the existing nodes of the network.Keywords
All Related Versions
- Version 1, 2023-04-03, Research Square
- Published version: Scientific Reports, 13 (1), 1.
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