Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
Authors:
- Peter BormPBPeter Borm
- Yuan JuYJYuan Ju
- David WettsteinDWDavid Wettstein
- 1 May 2015
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 157, 236-254
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- University of York
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