Does argumentation change minds?
Open Access
- 27 September 2024
- journal article
- Published by University of Windsor Leddy Library in Informal Logic
- Vol. 44 (3) , 339-360
Abstract
Our intuition is straightforward: yes, argumentation changes minds. It can’t be otherwise! But many cognitive and discursive habits seem to suggest otherwise. As the literature in the psychology of reasoning incessantly emphasizes, we hardly change our minds (and the minds of others) because a predisposed robust confirmation bias (or myside bias) is at work every time we argue, among other persistent cognitive illusions (Pohl, 2012), heuristics and biases (Santibáñez, 2023). To adequately answer the questions of why and how argumentation changes minds, if at all, this paper frames the problem in an evolutionary perspective. My main thesis is that argumentative competence changes minds because its ultimate goal (Laland et al., 2011; Scott-Phillips, Dickins & West, 2011) is to construct the future to predict more accurately (Suddendorf, Redshaw & Bulley, 2022). This idea converges with some evolutionary analysis of other cognitive skills and cultural inventions. To explain my perspective, I use the distinction between ultimate and proximal goals of a trait, and the cultural background of argumentative competence plays a fundamental role within this distinction. Notre intuition est simple: oui, l’argumentation change les men-talités. Mais de nombreuses habitudes cognitives et discursives suggèrent le contraire. Comme le soulignent sans cesse les écrits sur la psychologie du raisonnement, nous ne changeons guère d’avis parce qu’un biais de con-firmation robuste (ou biais de-mon-côté) prédisposé est à l’oeuvre lorsque nous argumentons. Pour répondre adéquatement aux questions de pour-quoi, comment et si l’argumentation change les mentalités, je pose le prob-lème dans une perspective évolution-niste. Je soutiens que la compétence ar-gumentative change les mentalités parce que son but ultime est de con-struire l’avenir, de prédire avec plus de précision. Cela converge avec les anal-yses évolutionnistes d’autres compé-tences cognitives et inventions cul-turelles. Pour expliquer ma perspec-tive, j’utilise la distinction entre les buts ultimes et proximaux d’un trait.Keywords
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