Post-quantum attacks on key distribution schemes in the presence of weakly stochastic sources
Open Access
- 21 September 2015
- conference paper
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Physics: Conference Series
- Vol. 633 (1) , 012029
Abstract
It has been established that the security of quantum key distribution protocols can be severely compromised were one to permit an eavesdropper to possess a very limited knowledge of the random sources used between the communicating parties. While such knowledge should always be expected in realistic experimental conditions, the result itself opened a new line of research to fully account for real-world weak randomness threats to quantum cryptography. Here we expand of this novel idea by describing a key distribution scheme that is provably secure against general attacks by a post-quantum adversary. We then discuss possible security consequences for such schemes under the assumption of weak randomness.Keywords
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