Dilemma solving by the coevolution of networks and strategy in agame
Author:
- 31 August 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 76 (2) , 021126
Abstract
A game model implemented by a coevolution mechanism of both networks and strategy, inspired by the work of Zimmermann and Eguiluz [Phys. Rev. E 72, 056118 (2005)] is established. Network adaptation is the manner in which an existing link between two agents is destroyed and how a new one is established to replace it. The strategy is defined as whether an agent offers cooperation or defection . Both the networks and strategy are synchronously renovated in a simulation time step. A series of numerical experiments, considering various game structures, reveals that the proposed coevolution mechanism can solve dilemmas in several game classes. The effect of solving a dilemma means mutual-cooperation reciprocity ( reciprocity), which is brought about by emerging several cooperative hub agents who have plenty of links. This effect can be primarily observed in game classes of the prisoner’s dilemma and stag hunt. The coevolution mechanism, however, seems counterproductive for game classes of leader and hero, where the alternating reciprocity (ST reciprocity) is meaningful.
Keywords
This publication has 22 references indexed in Scilit:
- Five Rules for the Evolution of CooperationScience, 2006
- Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift gameNature, 2004
- The good, the bad and the lonelyNature, 2002
- Zones of cooperation in demographic prisoner's dilemmaComplexity, 1998
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoringNature, 1998
- Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1994
- The Evolution of CooperationScience, 1981
- What is sociobiology?Society, 1978
- The Evolution of Reciprocal AltruismThe Quarterly Review of Biology, 1971
- The Evolution of Altruistic BehaviorThe American Naturalist, 1963