Moral hazard and optimal contract form for R&D cooperation
Author:
- Karl MoraschKMKarl Morasch
- 1 September 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 28 (1) , 63-78
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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