Reputation and social (dis)approval in feedback mechanisms: An experimental study
Authors:
- Marianne LumeauMLMarianne Lumeau
- David MascletDMDavid Masclet
- Thierry PenardTPThierry Penard
- 1 April 2015
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 112, 127-140
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- MSHB
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